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Resumen 
 
Nuestra investigación tiene como objetivo analizar las relaciones causales en el comportamiento de la deuda 
pública emitida por países miembros periféricos de la Unión Económica y Monetaria (UEM), con especial 
énfasis en los recientes episodios de crisis desatados en los mercados de deuda soberana de la zona euro 
desde 2009. Con este objetivo, empleamos una base de datos de la frecuencia diaria de los rendimientos de 
los bonos gubernamentales a 10 años emitidos por cinco países de la UEM (Grecia, Irlanda, Italia, Portugal y 
España), que abarca toda la historia de la UEM desde su inicio el 1 de enero de 1999 al 31 diciembre de 
2010. En la primera etapa, se explora la relación causal por pares entre los rendimientos, tanto para la mues-
tra completa y para submuestras cambiantes de los datos, con el fin de capturar posible relación causal en 
función del tiempo. Este enfoque nos permite detectar episodios de contagio entre los rendimientos de los 
bonos emitidos por países distintos. En el segundo paso, se estudian los factores determinantes de estos epi-
sodios de contagio, el análisis del papel desempeñado por diferentes factores, prestando especial atención a 
los instrumentos que capturan la deuda nacional total (doméstica y extranjera) en cada país. 
 
Palabras clave: rendimientos bonos soberanos, causalidad, contagio variable en el tiempo, eurozona, 
países periféricos UEM. 
 
Abstract 
 
Our research aims to analyze the causal relationships in the behavior of public debt issued by peripheral 
member countries of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), with special emphasis on the 
recent episodes of crisis triggered in the eurozone sovereign debt markets since 2009. With this goal in 
mind, we make use of a database of daily frequency of yields on 10-year government bonds issued by five 
EMU countries (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain), covering the entire history of the EMU from its 
inception on 1 January 1999 until 31 December 2010. In the first step, we explore the pair-wise causal rela-
tionship between yields, both for the whole sample and for changing subsamples of the data, in order to 
capture the possible time-varying causal relationship. This approach allows us to detect episodes of conta-
gion between yields on bonds issued by different countries. In the second step, we study the determinants of 
these contagion episodes, analyzing the role played by different factors, paying special attention to instru-
ments that capture the total national debt (domestic and foreign) in each country. 
 
Key words: sovereign bond yields, causality, time-varying contagion, euro area, peripheral EMU coun-
tries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
After the stability that characterized the first 
10 years of the European Economic and Mone-
tary Union (EMU), the serious tensions that 
arose in international financial markets in Au-
gust 2007 due to the US subprime crisis, and 
the collapse of the financial institution Leh-
man Brothers in September 2008, sparked a 
global financial crisis that affected the real 
sector and caused a rapid, synchronized dete-
rioration in most major economies. The eco-
nomic and financial crisis highlighted the im-
balances within the euro area which had 
probably been undervalued during the previ-
ous years of stability. It was as if the sovereign 
debt markets had underestimated the possibil-
ity that governments might default.  
 
From August 2007 onwards, yield spreads of 
euro area issues with respect to Germany spi-
raled in parallel with the rise in global finan-
cial instability that led to the “flight-to-
quality”, resulting in a transfer of funds to-
wards assets with a lower risk (the German 
bund) and an increase of the risk premium in 
the other EMU countries (see Figure 1). 
Therefore, in only four years the EMU bond 
markets went from a situation of stability and 
tranquility to their current situation of tur-
moil.  
 
With the rescues of Greece and Ireland in 
2010 and of Portugal and Greece again in 
2011, it seems increasingly clear that the ori-
gin of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe goes 
beyond the imbalances in public finances. The 
interconnection between the private and pub-
lic debt is obvious. In fact, while the ratio of 
public debt in the euro area dropped from 66% 
in 2003 to 63% in 2007, household debt in-
creased from 41% to 56% of GDP during the 
same period and financial institutions in-
creased their debt levels from 126% of GDP to 
close to 200%1.  
 
Indeed, the main causes of the debt crises in 
Europe vary according to country. In Ireland, 
the crisis was mainly due to the private sector, 
particularly a domestic housing boom which 
was financed by foreign borrowers who did 
not require a risk premium related to the 
probability of default (see Lane, 2011). In 
                                                 
1 As we explain in Sub-section 3.2, private debt data have been 
compiled using the Monetary Financial Institutions (MFI) 
balance sheet statistics provided for each country by the Euro-
pean Central Bank (see Table 6). 
Spain, since absorption exceeded production, 
the external debt grew and the real exchange 
rate appreciated, implying a loss of competi-
tiveness for the economy. Unlike previous 
expansions, the resort to financing was not led 
by the public sector but by private households 
and firms. The average value of the debt-to-
GDP ratio during the period 2007-2010 in 
Spain surpassed 80% in the public sector and 
was close to 90% in the private. 
 
In contrast to Ireland and Spain, the origin of 
the debt crisis in Greece and Portugal was the 
structural deficit in the government sector. If 
the crisis finally spreads to Italy, this structural 
deficit would be the possible cause.  Greece 
and Italy’s large fiscal deficit and huge public 
debt are the cumulative result of chronic mac-
roeconomic imbalances2. However, the case of 
Portugal illustrates the importance of foreign 
debt. Portugal’s debt-to-GDP ratio (63% at the 
end of December 2010) was much lower than 
Belgium’s (123%), but whilst the latter is a net 
creditor towards the rest of the world, the 
markets are worried about Portuguese high 
external debt3 (specifically, that of its private 
sector: banks and enterprises).  
 
Some studies have found a strong relationship 
between risk premium and a wide range of 
vulnerability indicators that cover not only the 
fiscal position, but also (1) the current account 
balance and the net position towards the rest 
of the world, (2) the reliance on external fund-
ing to finance a domestic expansion, (3) the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate and the 
loss of competitiveness and (4) the cross-
border banking system linkages to the gov-
ernment sector, among other things.  
 
The IMF (2010) and Barrios et al. (2009) pre-
sent empirical evidence of the strong relation-
ship between current account deficits and for-
eign debt and the behavior of sovereign risk 
premium. Moreover, Gros (2011) contends 
that foreign debt is more important than pub-
lic debt, and that this may have a number of 
implications for the ongoing eurozone crisis4.  
                                                 
2 As pointed out in Gómez-Puig (2006 and 2008), in the past, 
Italy may have benefited from the fact that “size matters for 
liquidity” and thus for the success of a sovereign debt market 
since at the end of 2010 its market was the biggest in the euro 
area.  
3 The current account deficit over GDP was 9.86% in December 
2010. 
4 This author points out that the importance of external debt is 
due to the fact that euro area governments retain full sover-
eignty over the taxation of their citizens, but they are bound by 
existing treaties and international norms and do not have a free 
hand in taxing non-citizens. Therefore, euro countries can 
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Other authors (Bolton and Jeanne (2011), 
Allen et al. (2011)), have focused on the study 
of cross-border banking system linkages to the 
government sector. Cross-border banking 
brings important stability benefits, but it also 
brings costs. Its effect on risk diversification is 
a key benefit. Since the assets of cross-border 
banks will be less exposed to country-specific 
shocks, they are less likely to have to constrain 
their lending or to fail to honor their debts. 
Therefore, the presence of foreign banks in a 
country is likely to enhance the stability and 
efficiency of the economy. 
 
On the side of costs, foreign capital is likely to 
be more mobile than domestic capital. In a 
crisis situation, foreign banks may simply de-
cide to “cut and run”. In addition, the increase 
in cross-border banking activity will also tend 
to increase the complexity, interconnected-
ness, and size of the institutions. Since cross-
border banks are more likely to be systemically 
relevant, their failure may impose significantly 
higher costs for economies than the failure of a 
purely domestic bank.  
 
Another important destabilizing force is con-
tagion: just as cross-border banking insulates 
the domestic economy from domestic shocks; 
it also exposes it to foreign ones. Moreover, 
since there are several channels linking the 
banking sector and the sovereign debt market, 
financial or sovereign crisis in a country can 
quickly spill over to other countries through 
an integrated banking system. All in all, the 
stability benefits from cross-border banking 
may outweigh the costs, provided its volume is 
not excessive. 
 
The European Union and, especially the euro 
area, witnessed a significant increase in cross-
border financial activity over the 10 years be-
fore the global crisis (see Barnes, Lane and 
Radziwill, 2010). Both the elimination of cur-
rency risk and regulatory convergence5 can 
explain the important increase in cross-border 
financial activity in the EMU (see Kalemli-
Ozcan, Papaioannou and Peydró-Alcalde, 
2009). Spiegel (2009a) shows that the relative 
increase in bilateral bank claims involving 
euro area members can be attributed to three 
                                                                         
always service their domestic debt, even without access to the 
printing press, but not their external debt.    
5 The introduction of the Single Banking License in 1989 
through the Second Banking Directive was a decisive step to-
wards a unified European financial market, which subsequently 
led to a convergence in financial legislation and regulation 
across member countries. 
different channels: (a) a “borrower” effect, by 
which euro membership increases creditwor-
thiness, (b) a “creditor” effect, which increases 
the attractiveness of a member country’s banks 
as financial intermediaries, and (c) a “pair-
wise” effect such that joint membership of the 
euro increases the quality of intermediation 
when both lender and borrower are in the 
monetary union.  
 
Spiegel (2009a) not only finds evidence that 
the pair-wise effect is the dominant one, but 
also that it is strongest for those country pairs 
that also have high levels of bilateral trade. 
Moreover, Spiegel (2009b) shows that the ef-
fect of the euro has been even stronger for 
some of the peripheral EMU countries. In par-
ticular, the sources of external financing for 
Portuguese and Greek banks radically shifted 
on joining the euro; traditionally reliant on 
dollar debt, these banks were subsequently 
able to raise funds from their counterparts 
elsewhere in the EMU. 
 
In this scenario of increased cross-border fi-
nancial activity in the euro area, Gray et al. 
(2008) points out the importance of identify-
ing the channels of contagion between the 
banking and the sovereign sectors, not only 
within a country but across countries as well. 
On the one hand, a systemic banking crisis can 
induce a contraction of the entire economy, 
weakening public finances and thus transfer-
ring the distress to the government. This con-
tagion effect is amplified when the financial 
sector has state guarantees. As a feedback ef-
fect, risk is further transmitted to holders of 
sovereign debt. On the other hand, macroeco-
nomic imbalances in a specific country lead to 
rising sovereign spreads and a devaluation of 
the government debt that is mirrored in banks’ 
balance sheets. In addition, sovereign or finan-
cial crisis in a country can quickly spill over to 
other countries through an integrated banking 
system.  
 
The recent literature on sovereign debt has 
generally ignored these linkages. But, as the 
recent European sovereign debt crisis has 
highlighted, contagion of the crisis in one 
country to others through the banking system 
can be a major issue. Only a handful of recent 
papers have addressed the interaction between 
sovereign default and the stability of the do-
mestic financial system. The analyses by Gen-
naioli, Martin and Rossi (2010), Broner, Mar-
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tin and Ventura (2010), Mody (2009) and 
Ejsing and Lemke (2009) are among them6.  
 
The papers most closely related to our analysis 
are the studies by Bolton and Jeanne (2011), 
Andenmatten and Brill (2011) and Sosvilla-
Rivero and Morales-Zumaquero (2011). Bolton 
and Jeanne (2011) analyze contagious sover-
eign debt crises in financially integrated 
economies. Under financial integration, banks 
optimally diversify their holdings of sovereign 
debt in an effort to minimize costs with respect 
to an individual country’s sovereign debt de-
fault and to guarantee their access to public 
liquidity (in return for lending to private 
banks, central banks generally require collat-
eral in the form of government and other 
highly rated securities)7. The central issue in 
their paper is the international contagion 
caused by the banks’ exposure to the sovereign 
risk of foreign countries. Using data from the 
2010 European stress test, they show that fi-
nancial integration without fiscal integration 
results in an inefficient equilibrium supply of 
government debt8.  
 
Andenmatten and Brill (2011) perform a 
bivariate test for contagion that is based on an 
approach proposed by Forbes and Rigobon 
(2002) to examine whether the co-movement 
of sovereign CDS premium increased signifi-
cantly after the beginning of the Greek debt 
crisis in October 2009. Unlike Forbes and 
Rigobon, they conclude that in European 
countries “both contagion and interdepend-
ence” occurred.  
  
In the first stage of their study, Sosvilla-Rivero 
and Morales-Zumaquero (2011) examine the 
behavior of daily yields for 11 EMU countries 
during the 2001-2010 period, decomposing 
volatility into permanent and transitory com-
                                                 
6 Beakert et al. (2011) analyze the transmission of crises to 
country-industry equity portfolios in 55 countries, using the 
2007-2009 financial crisis as a laboratory. 
7 This latter reason may have played a particularly important 
role in the euro area and may explain why there has been sub-
stantially faster financial integration among euro member coun-
tries than elsewhere, as De Santis and Gerard (2006) have high-
lighted.   
 
8The same conclusion is reached by Gros and Mayer (2011) who 
say that “The EU resembles a group of highly interdependent 
companies with large cross-holdings of equity stakes. However, 
the formal structure of the group is very light. There is no 
central authority that can give orders to individual members of 
the group”. They conclude that the euro area can no longer 
avoid a stark choice: “either it sticks to the limited liability 
character of EMU (but in this case sovereign default becomes 
likely), or it moves towards a fiscal union with a mutual guaran-
tee for the public debt of all member countries”.  
  
ponents. In the second stage, they test for cor-
relation and causality, detecting the existence 
of two different groups of countries – closely-
linked, core EMU countries and peripheral 
EMU countries – whose existence is validated 
using a cluster analysis. 
 
However, an important constraint in the 
above-mentioned empirical evidence is the fact 
that it ignores the dynamic component of the 
degree of contagion of the public debt mar-
kets. In this regard, Abad, Chuliá and Gómez-
Puig (2010 and 2011) examine the European 
government bond market integration from a 
dynamic perspective, applying an asset pricing 
model to a dataset spanning the years 2004 to 
2009. Their results suggest that, from the be-
ginning of the financial market tensions in 
August 2007, markets moved towards higher 
segmentation, and the differentiation of coun-
try risk factors increased substantially across 
countries9. Nonetheless, the evolution of the 
time-varying degree of causality and contagion 
between different EMU public debt markets 
has not yet been analyzed in sufficient depth 
by the literature. This paper aims to carry out 
an analysis of this kind.  
 
Thus, the main objectives of this paper are: (1) 
to test for the existence of possible causal rela-
tionships between the evolution of the yield of 
peripheral EMU countries’ issues, (2) to exam-
ine the time-varying nature of these causal 
relationships and to detect episodes of conta-
gion between them, and (3) to analyze the 
determinants of these contagion events con-
sidering not only macroeconomic imbalances 
and banking linkages, but also indicators of 
investor sentiment. This paper also makes 
three main contributions to the existing litera-
ture. First, it presents a dynamic approach to 
the analysis of the evolution of the degree of 
causality and contagion between different 
EMU public debt markets. Second, it makes 
use of a unique dataset on private debt-to-GDP 
by sector (households, banks and non-
financial corporations) in each EMU country, 
built up by the authors using the Monetary 
Financial Institutions (MFI) balance sheet 
statistics provided for each euro country by 
the European Central Bank. Besides, cross-
border banking linkages are measured using 
the consolidated claims on an immediate bor-
                                                 
9 Although the levels were very low, the persistence of positive 
yield spreads against Germany detected before the beginning of 
the crisis (see Gómez-Puig, 2009a and 2009b) was still a reflec-
tion of incomplete integration in EMU bond markets. 
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rower basis of Bank for International Settle-
ments reporting banks in the public, the bank-
ing and the non-financial private sectors, as a 
proportion of GDP. Third, it focuses the analy-
sis on peripheral EMU countries (Greece, Ire-
land, Italy, Portugal and Spain), since these are 
the countries which have come under fire in 
the markets since 2009, reflecting investors’ 
perceptions of risks, and which to a large ex-
tent have been the cause of the current sover-
eign debt crisis in the whole eurozone.  
 
The most important results of the analysis can 
be summarized as follows. Firstly, they pro-
vide empirical evidence of the existence of 
sub-periods of Granger causality in all pair-
wise relationships. Given the absence of con-
sensus about the definition of contagion, we 
identify contagion episodes as sub-periods of 
significant increase in causality.  So, the results 
suggest that these episodes are concentrated 
around the first year of the EMU in 1999, the 
introduction of euro coins and banknotes in 
2002, and the global financial crisis in the late-
2000s. Moreover, they also indicate that the 
causality relationships between peripheral 
EMU yields have significantly risen during the 
recent crises in sovereign debt markets from 
2009, providing evidence of an increase in the 
contagion between them. 
 
Secondly, the results of the probit models es-
timated to analyze the determinants of the 
contagion episodes show that in all cases the 
variable that captures cross-border banking 
linkages is statistically significant. This finding 
suggests that, in a scenario of increased inter-
national financial activity in the euro area, 
contagion of the crisis in one country to other 
countries through the banking system can be a 
major issue. Nevertheless, the instruments we 
have used to capture macroeconomic imbal-
ances in the different countries also indicate 
that these imbalances are key determinants of 
the probability of occurrence of a contagion 
episode. Lastly, regarding the role of private 
debt, we find evidence supporting its impor-
tance in the cases of Spain and Italy and we 
detect a relevant effect of foreign bank claims 
on banking and non-financial private sector 
debt-to-GDP on the probability of contagion 
from Ireland.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents the causality analysis and 
our approach for the detection of contagion 
episodes. In Section 3 we carry out the explo-
ration of the determinants of these contagion 
events. Finally, Section 4 summarizes the find-
ings and offers some concluding remarks.  
 
2. Causality and contagion 
 
2.1 ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
 
Granger’s causality test is widely used to test 
for the relationship between two variables. 
However, causality tests are sensitive to lag 
length and, therefore, it is important that the 
lengths selected should be the right ones; oth-
erwise, the model estimates will be inconsis-
tent and misleading inferences may be drawn 
(see, Thornton and Batten, 1985). In this pa-
per, we use Hsiao’s (1981) generalization of 
the Granger notion of causality. Hsiao pro-
posed a sequential method to test for causality, 
which combines Akaike’s final predictive error 
(FPE, from now on) and the definition of 
Granger causality. Essentially, the FPE crite-
rion trades off bias that arises from under-
parameterization of a model against a loss in 
efficiency resulting from over-parameterization 
of the model.  
 
 
Consider the following models,  
t 0
1
m
i t i t
i
X Xα δ ε−
=
= + +∑                       (1) 
0
1 1
m n
t i t i j t j t
i j
X X Yα δ γ ε− −
= =
= + + +∑ ∑              (2) 
where Xt and Yt  are stationary variables [i.e., 
they are I(0) variables]. The following steps 
are used to apply Hsiao’s procedure for testing 
causality: 
 
i) Treat Xt as a one-dimensional auto-
regressive process (1), and compute its 
FPE with the order of lags m varying 
from 1 to m10. Choose the order which 
yields the smallest FPE, say m, and 
denote the corresponding FPE as FPEX 
(m, 0). 
 
ii) Treat Xt as a controlled variable 
with m number of lags, and treat Yt as 
a manipulated variable as in (2). Com-
pute again the FPE of (2) by varying 
the order of lags of Yt from 1 to n, and 
                                                 
10 FPEX(m,0)  is computed using the formula: 
1( ,0) · ,
1X
T m SSRFPE m
T m T
+ += − − where T is the total number 
of observations and SSR is the sum of squared residuals of OLS 
regression (1) 
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determine the order which gives the 
smallest FPE, say n, and denote the 
corresponding FPE as FPEX (m,n)11. 
 
iii) Compare FPEX (m, 0) with 
FPEX (m,n) [i.e., compare the smallest 
FPE in step (i) with the smallest FPE 
in step (ii)]. If FPEX (m,0) > FPEX 
(m,n), then Yt is said to cause Xt. If 
FPEX (m,0) < FPEX (m,n), then Xt is 
an independent process. 
 
iv) Repeat steps i) to iii) for the Yt 
variable, treating Xt as the manipu-
lated variable. 
 
When Xt and Yt are not stationary variables, 
but are first-difference stationary [i.e., they are 
I(1) variables] and cointegrated (see Dolado et 
al., 1990), it is possible to investigate the 
causal relationships from ∆Xt to ∆Yt and from 
∆Yt to ∆Xt, using the following error correction 
models: 
 
0 1
1
m
t t i t i t
i
X Z Xα β δ ε− −
=
Δ = + + Δ +∑           (3) 
0 1
1 1
m n
t t i t i j t j t
i j
X Z X Yα β δ γ ε− − −
= =
Δ = + + Δ + Δ +∑ ∑ (4) 
                                                 
11 FPEX(m,n)  is computed using the formula: 
1( , ) · ,
1X
T m n SSRFPE m n
T m n T
+ + += − − − where T is the total 
number of observations and SSR is the sum of squared residuals 
of OLS regression (2) 
 
where Zt is the OLS residual of the cointegrat-
ing regression ( t tX Yμ λ= + ), known as the 
error-correction term. Note that, if Xt and Yt are 
I (1) variables, but they are not cointegrated, 
then β in (3) and (4) is assumed to be equal to 
zero. 
 
In both cases [i.e., Xt  and Yt  are I(1) variables, 
and they are or are not cointegrated], we can 
use Hsiao’s sequential procedure substituting 
Xt with ∆Xt and Yt with ∆Yt in steps i) to iv), as 
well as substituting expressions (1) and (2) 
with equations (3) and (4). 
 
2.2 DATA 
 
We use daily data of 10-year bond yields from 
1 January 1999 to 31 December 2010 collected 
from Thomson Reuters Datastream for EMU 
peripheral countries: Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain. 
 
Figures 1a and 1b plot the daily 10-year sover-
eign bond yield and the spread against the 
bund for each country in our sample. A simple 
look at these figures indicates the differences 
in the yield behavior before and after the fi-
nancial crisis of 2008. 
 
 
Figure 1a. Daily 10-year sovereign yields in peripheral EMU countries: 1999-2010 
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Figure 1b. Daily 10-year sovereign yield spreads over Germany: 1999-2010 
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Specifically, after the introduction of the euro 
in January 1999 and until the subprime crisis 
in global financial markets in August 2007, 
spreads on bonds of eurozone members moved 
in a narrow range with only slight differentia-
tion across countries. In fact, the stability and 
convergence of spreads was considered a hall-
mark of successful financial integration inside 
the euro area. Nevertheless, after the subprime 
crisis in 2007 severe tensions emerged in fi-
nancial markets worldwide, including the 
EMU bond market. Following the collapse of 
the US financial institution Lehman Brothers 
on 15 September 2008, the financial turmoil 
turned into a global financial crisis which be-
gan to spread to the real sector.  
 
At the same time, the financial crisis showed 
that imbalances within euro countries still 
persisted, since interest rate differentials be-
tween government bond issues of participating 
countries, which had reached levels close to 
zero between 2003 and 2007 (the average 
value of the 10-year yield spread against the 
German bund moved between -4 and 20 basis 
points, in the case of Ireland and Greece, re-
spectively), now reemerged. In fact, the risk 
premium on EMU government bonds, which 
had followed a secular downward trend in the 
past, increased strongly in 2008, reflecting 
investor perceptions of upcoming risks; by the 
end of December 2010 it reached levels of 952 
basis points in Greece, 580 in Ireland, 380 in 
Portugal, 255 in Spain and 182 in Italy.  
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the 
levels and differences of the 10-year govern-
ment’s yield in the above-mentioned EMU 
countries during the sample period (1999-
2010). As can be seen, the mean is not signifi-
cantly different from zero for the first differ-
ences. Normality is tested with the Jarque-Bera 
test (which is distributed as χ2(2) under the 
null) and strongly rejected for both the levels 
and first differences. Since rejection could be 
due to either excess of kurtosis or skewness, 
we report these statistics separately in Table 1. 
Given that the kurtosis of the normal distribu-
tion is 3, our results suggest that the distribu-
tion of the yields of Greece and Ireland, as well 
as all the first differences, are peaked relative 
to the normal, while the distribution of the 
yields in the cases of Italy, Portugal and Spain 
are flat relative to the normal. Finally, regard-
ing the asymmetry of the distribution of the 
series around their mean, we find positive 
skewness for all the variables in levels and for 
the first difference in the case of Italy, suggest-
ing that their distributions have long right 
tails, while in the cases of the first differences 
of yields for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain there is evidence of negative skewness 
and therefore distributions with long left tails. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Levels     
  GR IE IT PT SP 
 Mean 4.995 4.543 4.491 4.541 4.379 
 Median 4.544 4.459 4.374 4.405 4.232 
 Maximum 12.440 9.012 5.879 7.104 5.870 
 Minimum 3.206 3.038 3.215 2.997 3.025 
 Std. Dev. 1.637 0.828 0.615 0.722 0.650 
 Skewness 2.714 1.236 0.343 0.423 0.376 
 Kurtosis 10.589 7.304 2.268 2.793 2.230 
 Jarque-Bera 9468.5 3213.9 131.5 99.0 151.2 
 Observations 2610 3131 3131 3131 3131 
Panel B: First differences       
  DGR DIE DIT DPT DSP 
 Mean 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 Median 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 Maximum 1.304 0.682 0.213 0.546 0.253 
 Minimum -4.323 -1.028 -0.319 -1.470 -0.441 
 Std. Dev. 0.117 0.058 0.041 0.062 0.044 
 Skewness -17.879 -1.162 0.181 -4.230 -0.077 
 Kurtosis 720.496 48.784 5.562 113.490 7.960 
 Jarque-Bera 56102048.0 274076.8 873.0 1601451.0 3211.0 
 Observations 2609 3130 3130 3130 3130 
Note: In all tables GR, IE, IT, PT and SP stand for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
 
2.3. PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
 
As a first step, we tested for the order of inte-
gration of the 10-year bond yields by means of 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. The 
results, shown in Table 2, decisively reject the 
null hypothesis of nonstationarity, suggesting 
that both variables can be treated as first-
difference stationary.  
 
Table 2. Augmented Dickey-  
Fuller tests for unit roots. 
Panel A: I (2) versus I (1) 
 ττ τµ τ 
DGR -17.8072* -17.6380* -17.5929* 
DIE -47.7382* -47.7020* -47.6802* 
DIT -52.3394* -52.3468* -52.3535* 
DPT -31.6051* -31.5955* -31.5838* 
DSP -51.8722* -51.8773* -51.8802* 
Panel B: I (1) versus I (0) 
 ττ τµ τ 
GR 0.2766 1.2043 1.5440 
IE 0.3425 0.3400 1.3145 
IT -2.6923 -2.0867 0.0225 
PT -1.0206 -1.2202 0.6855 
SP -1.8358 -1.7678 0.2859 
Notes: The ADF statistic is a test for the null hypothesis of a 
unit root. ττ, τμ and τ denote the ADF statistics with drift and 
trend, with drift, and without drift, respectively.  
* denotes significance at the 1% level. Critical values based 
on MacKinnon (1996) 
 
Following Carrion-i-Silvestre et al. (2001)’s 
suggestion, we confirm this result using the 
Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) tests (KPSS), where 
the null is a stationary process against the al-
ternative of a unit root. As can be seen in Ta-
ble 3, the results fail to reject the null hy-
pothesis of stationarity in first differences, but 
strongly reject it in levels. 
 
Table 3. KPSS tests for stationarity 
Panel A: I (2) versus I (1) 
  ττ τµ 
DGR  0.1052 0.2574 
DIE  0.0877 0.3287 
DIT  0.1083 0.1072 
DPT  0.1103 0.1868 
DSP  0.0975 0.1551 
Panel B: I (1) versus I (0) 
  ττ τµ 
GR  0.9832* 1.8948* 
IE  1.1606* 1.1528* 
IT  0.6825* 2.9237* 
PT  0.9373* 1.6140* 
SP  0.8374* 3.0079* 
Notes: The KPSS statistic is a test for the null hypothesis of 
stationarity. 
ττ and τμ denote the KPSS statistics with drift and trend, and 
with drift, respectively.  
* denotes significance at the 1% level. Asymptotic critical 
values based on Kwiatkowski et al. (1992. Table 1) 
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As a second step, we tested for cointegration 
between each of the 10 pair combinations12 of 
peripheral EMU yields using Johansen (1991, 
1995)’s approach. An important decision in 
this approach is whether to include determi-
nistic terms in the cointegrating VAR. Deter-
ministic terms, such as the intercept, linear 
trend, and indicator variables, play a crucial 
role in both data behavior and limiting distri-
butions of estimators and tests in integrated 
processes. Results in Banerjee et al. (1993), 
Johansen (1994) and Nielsen and Rahbek 
(2000) show the statistical properties of the 
commonly used test, indicating that in some 
cases its size cannot be controlled, and in oth-
ers there is substantial power loss. Depending 
on their presence or absence, the system may 
manifest drift, linear trends in cointegration 
vectors, or even quadratic trends. In practical 
work, there seem to be only two relevant 
model representations for the analysis of coin-
tegration amongst most economic time series 
variables:   
i. the level data have no deterministic 
trend and the cointegrating equa-
tions have intercepts; and  
 
ii. the level and the cointegrating equa-
tions have linear trends.  
 
Table 1 shows that the hypothesis of the ex-
pected values of the first differences of the 
series is equal to zero can not be rejected; 
hence, there is no evidence of linear determi-
nistic trends in the data. The graphs in Figure 
1a support this conclusion. Therefore, we con-
clude that the cointegrated VAR model should 
be formulated according to i), with the con-
stant term restricted to the cointegration 
space, and no deterministic trend terms. This 
implies that some equilibrium means are dif-
ferent from zero.  
 
As can be seen in Table 4, only for the Greece-
Ireland and Greece-Portugal cases does the 
trace test indicate the existence of one cointe-
grating equation at (at least) the 0.05 level. 
Therefore, for these two pairs we test for 
Granger-causality in first differences of the 
variables, with an error-correction term added 
[i. e., equations (3) and (4)], whereas for the 
remaining cases, we test for Granger-causality 
                                                 
12 Recall that the number of possible pairs between our sample of 
five peripheral EMU yields is given by the following formula 
! 5! 10.
!( )! 2!(5 2)!
n
r n r
= =− −
 
in first differences of the variables, with no 
error-correction term added [i. e., equations 
(3) and (4) with β=0] 
 
Table 4. Cointegration tests 
 Hypothe-
sized num-
bers of  
cointegrat-
ing rela-
tions 
Trace 
statistica 
 
p-valueb
GR. IE None 
At most one  
20.3839** 
1.0135 
0.0481 
0.9498 
GR. IT None 
At most one  
16.5832 
3.0084 
0.1488 
0.5791 
GR. PT None 
At most one  
21.0916** 
2.8721 
0.0384 
0.6049 
GR. 
SP 
None 
At most one  
14.7411 
2.6170 
0.2416 
0.6544 
IE. IT None 
At most one  
12.6781 
1.2744 
0.3901 
0.9118 
IE. PT None 
At most one  
10.2764 
1.7622 
0.6127 
0.8244 
IE. SP None 
At most one  
9.67O6 
1.0393 
0.6721 
0.9464 
IT. PT None 
At most one  
9.2582 
1.8854 
0.7119 
0.8004 
IT. SP None 
At most one  
13.5751 
2.7382 
0.3197 
0.6307 
PT. SP None 
At most one  
15.5181 
2.9255 
0.1981 
0.5947 
Notes:  a * and ** denote rejection of the hypothesis at the 
1% and 5% level, respectively.   
            b MacKinnon et al. (1999)’s p-values. 
 
2.4. WHOLE SAMPLE RESULTS 
The resulting FPE statistics for the whole sam-
ple are reported in Table 5.13 
 
As can be seen, in most of the cases our results 
suggest bidirectional Granger causality. We do 
not find unidirectional Granger causality rela-
tionships running from Greece to Spain or 
from Portugal to Ireland.  
 
                                                 
13 These results were confirmed using both Wald statistics to test 
the joint hypothesis 1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ... 0nγ γ γ= = = =  in equation (4) 
and Williams-Kloot test for forecasting accuracy (Williams, 
1959). These additional results are not shown here to save 
space, but they are available from the authors upon request.  
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Table 5. FPE statistics for 
the whole sample 
 FPE(m.0)x10-3 FPE(m.n) x10-3 Causality 
GR→IE 3.4311 (1.0) 3.3972 (1.1) Yes 
IE→GR 13.1864 (4.0) 12.8586 (4.4) Yes 
GR→IT 1.6707 (1.0) 1.6695 (1.1) Yes 
IT→GR 13.1864 (4.0) 13.0770 (4.1) Yes 
GR→PT 3.5423 (4.0) 3.5096 (4.1) Yes 
PT→GR 13.1864 (4.0) 12.6075 (4.4) Yes 
GR→SP 1.9055 (4.0) 1.9063 (4.1) No 
SP→GR 13.1864 (4.0) 13.1102 (4.4) Yes 
IE→IT 1.6910 (1.0) 1.6586 (1.1) Yes 
IT→IE 3.2584 (1.0) 3.2596 (1.1) Yes 
IE→PT 3.8007 (4.0) 3.6855 (4.1) Yes 
PT→IE 3.2584 (1.0) 3.2602 (1.1) No 
IE→SP 1.9248 (4.0) 1.8941 (4.1) Yes 
SP→IE 3.2584 (1.0) 1.9248 (1.4) Yes 
IT→PT 3.8007 (4.0) 3.7989 (4.1) Yes 
PT→IT 1.6910 (1.0) 1.6812 (1.1) Yes 
IT→SP 1.9248 (4.0) 1.9214 (4.1) Yes 
SP→IT 1.6910 (1.0) 1.6878 (1.1) Yes 
PT→SP 1.9248 (4.0) 1.9183 (4.1) Yes 
SP→PT 3.8007 (4.0) 3.7832 (4.11) Yes 
Note: The figures in brackets are the optimum order of lags in each pair of countries 
Note that, even though the results of the coin-
tegration tests reject (with only two excep-
tions) a long-run relationship between them, 
we find evidence of strong causal linkages 
between peripheral EMU yields. Therefore, 
each yield series contains useful information 
that is not present in the others which can 
help to explain the others’ short-run evolution. 
This finding may indicate that peripheral EMU 
countries are considered by market partici-
pants as a group, confirming earlier evidence 
of market segmentation between core and pe-
ripheral EMU countries (see, e.g., Sosvilla-
Rivero and Morales-Zumaquero, 2011). 
 
2.5. ROLLING REGRESSION RESULTS 
 
In this sub-section, we use rolling analysis to 
gain further insights into the dynamic causal-
ity between the 10 possible relationships in 
peripheral EMU yields. Specifically, we report 
the results of estimates from a sequence of 
short rolling samples to track a possibly time-
varying relationship. We carry out 33,486 re-
gressions using a window of 200 observa-
tions14. In each estimation, we apply Hsiao 
                                                 
14 To the best of our knowledge, there is no statistical method to 
set the optimal window size. The chosen value of 200 observa-
tions is representative of the one used in practice and seems 
appropriate for our empirical application since it represents 
6.36% of the sample. 
(1981)’s sequential procedure outlined above 
to determine the optimum FPE (m, 0) and 
FPE (m, n) statistics in each case.  
 
A graphic presentation of the evolution of the 
difference between FPE (m, 0) and FPE (m, n) 
statistics in each case is shown in Figure 2. 
These graphs provide us with a view of the 
dynamic influence of each EMU peripheral 
yield over the other four and constitute our 
indicator of time-varying causality. Adopting a 
forward-looking framework, we assign the 
computed indicator to the first date used in 
the rolling regressions. Therefore, the sample 
covers the period 1 January 1999 to 26 March 
2010 in all cases, except in those pairs where 
Greece is present, in which case the sample 
runs from 1 January 2001 to 26 March 2010. 
Note that if the difference is positive in the 
case XX → YY, this indicates the existence of a 
statistically significant Granger causality rela-
tionship running from country XX towards 
country YY.  
 
As can be seen, we find sub-periods of Granger 
causality in all pair-wise relationships, includ-
ing those running from Greece to Spain and 
from Portugal to Ireland, even though these 
relationships were rejected in the whole sam-
ple tests.  
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Figure 2: FPE sequence from rolling regressions 
GR- > IE
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Given that there is no consensus on exactly 
what constitutes contagion or how it should be 
defined, in our analysis we define contagion 
episodes in a restrictive way as sub-periods of 
significant increase in causality. As a rule of 
the thumb, we identify such sub-periods of 
intense causality as those in which the time-
varying causality indicator is greater than its 
average plus two standard errors15. 
                                                 
15 We perform formal tests to evaluate whether the series have 
the same mean during the contagion episodes detected and the 
rest of the observations. The results of these tests (not shown 
here, but available from the authors upon request) strongly 
reject the null hypothesis of .equal mean across sub-samples, 
and provide strong evidence of the presence of increased causal-
ity. 
The graphs in Figure 2 suggest that the conta-
gion episodes are concentrated around the first 
year of the existence of the EMU in 1999, the 
introduction of euro coins and banknotes in 
2002, and the global financial crisis of the late-
2000s. As can be seen, the graphs also indicate 
that the causality relationships between pe-
ripheral EMU yields increased significantly 
during the recent crises in sovereign debt mar-
kets since 2009, providing evidence of a 
strengthening in the contagion between them. 
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3. Determinants of contagion 
 
3.1. ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
 
We use probit models to analyze the determi-
nants of the contagion episodes we have de-
tected. In our case, we define a new dependent 
variable (y) that takes the value one if we have 
detected contagion and zero otherwise. The 
goal is to quantify the relationship between a 
set of instruments (X) characterizing the coun-
try issuing a given bond and the probability of 
contagion (y). 
 
To this end, we adopt a specification designed 
to handle the particular requirements of binary 
dependent variables. Suppose that we model 
the probability of observing a value of one as: 
 
Pr (y = 1| X, β) = 1 – Φ (–X’ β) = Φ (X’ β)   (5) 
 
where Φ is the cumulative distribution func-
tion of the standard normal distribution. As 
can be seen, we adopt the standard simplifying 
convention of assuming that the index specifi-
cation is linear in the parameters so that it 
takes the form X’β. 
 
3.2. INSTRUMENTS TO MODEL THE TIME-
VARYING CONTAGION 
 
According to Dornbusch, Park, and Claessens 
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(2000), reasons for contagion can be divided 
into two groups: fundamental-based reasons 
on the one hand, and investor behavior-based 
reasons on the other. While fundamental-
based contagion works through real and finan-
cial linkages across countries, behavior-based 
contagion is more sentiment-driven. 
 
In our analysis we will use instruments that 
capture both kinds of reasons. Following the 
literature (the IMF (2010), Barrios et al. 
(2009), Mody (2009) and Bolton and Jeanne 
(2011) among others), in order to measure 
fundamental reasons of contagion we not only 
use instruments that gauge the country’s fiscal 
position but also instruments that assess the 
foreign debt, the country’s potential rate of 
growth, the loss of competitiveness, the private 
sector indebtedness and the cross-border 
banking system linkages. Specifically, 
 
i) The government debt-to-GDP 
(GOVDEB) and the government defi-
cit-to-GDP (DEF) are the variables 
used to measure the country’s fiscal 
position. These two variables have 
been widely used in the literature by 
other authors (see, e.g., Bayoumi et al., 
1995) and present the advantage over 
the credit rating that they cannot be 
considered ex post measures of fiscal 
sustainability. They are compiled from 
Eurostat, and monthly data are linearly 
interpolated from quarterly observa-
tions. 
 
ii) The current-account-balance-
to-GDP ratio (CAC) is the instrument 
used as a proxy of the foreign debt and 
the net position of the country towards 
the rest of the world. The importance 
of this variable has been underlined by 
the IMF (2010) and Barrios et al. 
(2009). This variable is drawn from 
the OECD and monthly data are line-
arly interpolated from quarterly obser-
vations. 
 
iii) In view of Mody (2009)’s argu-
ment that countries’ sensitivity to the 
financial crisis is more pronounced the 
greater the loss of growth potential 
and competitiveness, we include in-
struments that measure these features. 
 
iv) The leading indicator (LEA), 
the GDP rate of growth (GRO) and the 
unemployment rate (U) are the vari-
ables used to capture the country’s 
growth potential. The leading indica-
tor is obtained from the OECD on a 
monthly basis, whilst the unemploy-
ment rate and the GDP rate of growth 
are collected from Eurostat (in the lat-
ter case, monthly data are interpolated 
from quarterly observations). 
 
v) The Harmonized Index of Con-
sumer Prices monthly rate of growth is 
the inflation rate measure (INF) we 
use in our analysis as a proxy of the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate 
and, thus, the country’s loss of com-
petitiveness. It is taken from Eurostat.  
 
As we outlined in the introduction, the origin 
of sovereign debt crisis in Europe goes beyond 
the imbalances in public finances. In some 
countries, such as Ireland, the crisis was 
mainly due to the private sector, particularly 
the domestic housing boom which was fi-
nanced by foreign borrowing (see Lane, 2011). 
For this reason we also incorporate instru-
ments that capture the indebtedness of each 
country’s private sector in the analysis. 
 
vi) These variables are: Banks’ 
debt-to-GDP (BANDEB), non-financial 
corporations’ debt-to-GDP (NFIDEB), 
and households’ debt-to-GDP 
(HOUDEB), constructed from data ob-
tained from the European Central 
Bank Statistics. In particular, we use 
the statistics corresponding to the 
Monetary Financial Institutions (MFI) 
balance sheets in each euro country.  
Thus, household debt corresponds to 
the total loans to households from 
MFIs. To isolate it from the interme-
diation effect that would inflate debt 
ratios, banks’ debt is constructed by 
subtracting M3, banks’ remaining li-
abilities and banks’ capital and reserves 
from total MFI liabilities16. And non-
financial corporation debt is built up 
by adding non-financial corporation 
securities to total loans to non-
financial corporations from MFIs17. 
                                                 16
 The banks’ debt variable we have constructed avoids the 
effects of intermediation, even though it can only be considered 
as an approximation of its real value, and some caveats are in 
order: specifically, some deposits will appear as debt (those not 
included in M3) and some debt securities will not be considered 
debt (those included in M3). 
17 Non-financial corporations’ (NFCs) debt should also include 
“net equity of households” (liabilities of NFCs from direct 
pension commitments to their employees). Nevertheless, we 
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Note: Debt-to-GDP at the end of each year.   
Source: Eurostat, Monetary Financial Institutions (MFIs) balance sheets obtained from the European Central Bank and 
authors’ estimates. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 shows that after the subprime crisis in 
August 2007, not only does the government 
level of indebtedness increase in the euro area 
(the ratio over the GDP achieves levels of 
143%, 119%, 96%, 93% and 63% at the end of 
December 2010 in Greece, Italy, Ireland, Spain 
and Portugal, respectively) but private borrow-
ing also registers a sizeable increase. In par-
ticular, as can be observed, at the end of 2010, 
                                                                         
have ignored this variable since it was not available for all the 
countries in the sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
banks’ debt-to-GDP is huge in Ireland (729%), 
but is also high in Portugal, Spain and Greece 
(182%, 159% and 98%). On the other hand, 
households’ debt-to-GDP surpasses the 80% 
threshold in Ireland, Portugal and Spain, 
whilst non-financial corporations’ debt-to-
GDP is close to 90% in Portugal and Spain and 
around 70% in Ireland. Thus, during the pe-
riod 2007-2010, whereas the government debt-
to-GDP ratio registers the highest increases 
compared to the period 2002-2006 in Ireland, 
Portugal and Greece (39%, 15% and 9%), there 
is a much steeper rise in the banks’ debt-to-
GREECE 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 2002-06 (I) 
Average 
2007-10 (II) % (II)/(I) 
Banks 24.6 26.0 25.5 28.4 33.7 48.4 63.2 68.5 97.6 27.6 69.4 151% 
Households 19.5 22.6 27.0 32.6 37.0 40.4 40.8 41.5 59.9 35.7 45.6 28% 
Non-financial 
corporations 32.6 33.2 34.0 37.5 39.0 43.1 50.9 48.0 53.0 41.3 48.8 18% 
General Go-
vernment 101.7 97.4 98.9 109.0 106.4 105.4 110.7 127.1 142.8 111.0 121.5 9% 
IRELAND 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 2002-06 (I) 
Average 
2007-10 (II) % (II)/(I) 
Banks 287.1 329.0 399.3 491.9 579.6 609.7 726.1 753.6 729.1 417.4 704.6 69% 
Households 43.9 48.5 60.9 70.9 77.8 81.2 84.8 92.3 89.5 72.2 86.9 20% 
Non-financial 
corporations 40.2 44.0 55.4 63.6 79.9 91.3 105.9 107.2 72.0 73.3 94.1 28% 
General Go-
vernment 30.7 31.0 29.5 27.4 24.8 25.0 44.4 65.6 96.2 41.6 57.8 39% 
ITALY 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 2002-06 (I) 
Average 
2007-10 (II) % (II)/(I) 
Banks 65.5 69.4 71.9 77.1 85.6 94.1 104.1 105.9 104.3 73.9 102.1 38% 
Households 21.5 23.0 25.1 27.0 28.5 29.8 30.3 32.7 38.1 28.4 32.7 15% 
Non-financial 
corporations 44.4 46.4 47.4 48.0 51.7 56.8 60.9 61.7 62.3 53.3 60.4 13% 
General Go-
vernment 105.7 104.4 103.9 105.9 106.6 103.6 106.3 116.1 119.0 107.9 111.3 3% 
PORTUGAL 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 2002-06 (I) 
Average 
2007-10 (II) % (II)/(I) 
Banks 106.3 113.3 101.6 103.8 115.3 126.4 136.6 156.3 182.5 108.1 150.4 39% 
Households 59.3 58.6 60.4 64.5 70.7 74.5 78.3 81.7 82.3 70.0 79.2 13% 
Non-financial 
corporations 68.2 67.9 67.2 70.8 72.7 78.7 90.8 93.0 90.6 77.8 88.3 14% 
General Go-
vernment 53.8 55.9 57.6 62.8 69.5 68.3 71.6 83.0 93.0 68.4 79.0 15% 
SPAIN 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 2002-06 (I) 
Average 
2007-10 (II) % (II)/(I) 
Banks 72.4 78.5 84.7 107.3 116.9 133.7 150.1 161.4 159.2 92.0 151.1 64% 
Households 47.5 51.1 55.8 66.4 74.2 78.3 81.9 83.5 82.1 69.0 81.4 18% 
Non-financial 
corporations 47.1 49.6 53.8 63.0 76.3 85.5 91.2 90.4 87.0 71.6 88.5 24% 
General Go-
vernment 52.5 48.7 46.2 43.0 39.6 36.1 39.8 53.3 60.1 46.6 47.3 2% 
Table 6. Debt-to-GDP by sector 
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GDP ratio which is higher than 150% in 
Greece, close to 70% in Ireland, around 64% in 
Spain and close to 40% in Portugal. Besides, 
households’ debt-to-GDP ratio registers an 
increase close to 30% in Greece, close to 20% 
in Ireland and Spain and around 15% in Italy, 
whilst non-financial corporations’ debt-to-
GDP ratio rises close to 30%, 25% and 20% in 
Ireland, Spain and Greece respectively. 
 
Following Bolton and Jeanne (2011) and Allen 
et al. (2011), in our analysis we include vari-
ables that capture the important cross-border 
banking system linkages in euro area coun-
tries. These cross-border banking linkages are 
measured using the consolidated claims on an 
immediate borrower basis of Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements (BIS) reporting banks in the 
public, banking and non-financial private sec-
tors as a proportion of GDP. 
 
vii) In particular, we include for-
eign bank claims on government debt-
to-GDP (PUB), on bank debt-to-GDP 
(BAN) and on non-financial private 
sector debt-to-GDP (PRI). These vari-
ables are constructed from information 
provided by the Bank for International 
Settlements and the OECD. 
 
viii) Moreover, we explore the role 
of consolidated claims on an immedi-
ate borrower basis provided by BIS by 
nationality of reporting banks as a 
proportion of total foreign claims on 
each country. This variable is denoted 
as XXYYBAN, meaning the percentage 
of country XX’s foreign claims held by 
country YY’s banks. 
 
 
Table 7. Foreign banks’ claims on individual countries-to-GDP by sector. 
Foreign banks’ claims on public 
sector debt/GDP        
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
GREECE 30.79 33.64 36.07 30.56 29.93 17.64 29.77 
IRELAND 4.78 6.19 7.56 8.37 15.19 11.69 8.96 
ITALY 20.59 21.55 23.24 21.45 24.05 13.07 20.66 
PORTUGAL 19.47 22.03 20.61 20.60 24.00 12.68 19.90 
SPAIN 8.46 8.86 8.16 7.50 9.21 6.73 8.15 
Foreign banks’ claims on banks 
debt/GDP         
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
GREECE 6.23 7.02 10.04 12.17 10.33 3.55 8.23 
IRELAND 103.93 120.21 140.62 100.51 92.71 51.09 101.51 
ITALY 10.85 12.87 14.97 11.03 9.46 7.38 11.09 
PORTUGAL 15.77 19.14 23.58 19.71 21.08 15.88 19.19 
SPAIN 16.72 20.78 26.61 23.51 23.03 14.91 20.93 
Foreign banks’ claims on non-financial private 
sector debt/GDP     
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
GREECE 16.73 27.42 35.73 36.01 26.07 26.22 28.03 
IRELAND 133.91 177.50 251.16 269.12 252.07 213.98 216.29 
ITALY 11.60 20.67 28.28 23.07 24.97 22.83 21.90 
PORTUGAL 32.12 38.35 46.84 46.22 49.83 45.57 43.15 
SPAIN 17.38 25.38 33.61 29.83 30.52 25.09 26.97 
Note: Reliance on foreign bank financing is measured by the consolidated claims on an immediate borrower basis of Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS) reporting banks on each sector (public, banks and non-financial corporations as a propor-
tion of GDP). Data correspond to the end of each year.  
Source: This table has been constructed from data collected from Table 9C of BIS Quarterly Review: June 2011 and the 
OECD. 
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The figures in Table 7 underline the fact that 
the causes of the debt crises that led to subse-
quent rescues in Europe varied substantially 
according to country. Greek fiscal deficit and 
public debt to GDP were close to 15% and 
130% at the end of 2009 as a result of chronic 
macroeconomic imbalances. Besides, on aver-
age, foreign banks’ claims on its public sector 
debt represented around 30% of its GDP dur-
ing the period 2005-2010. Conversely, in Ire-
land, the crisis was mainly due to the private 
sector, particularly the domestic housing 
boom which was financed by foreign borrow-
ing. In particular, the amount of bank and  
non-financial enterprise debt claimed by for-
eign banks is huge during the period 2005-
2010 (102% and 216% of its GDP, on average). 
Finally, in Portugal, markets were mostly wor-
ried about the country’s high external debt, 
specifically, that of its non-financial corpora-
tions. During the 2005-2010 period, foreign 
banks’ claims on Portuguese enterprises sur-
passed 40% of the country’s GDP.   
 
As stated before, the Bank for International 
Settlements also provides information about 
the country of origin of the foreign claims. 
This information is displayed in Table 8. 
Table 8. Claims by nationality of reporting banks as a 
proportion of total foreign claims. 
GREECE 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average
Austrian banks 3.3 2.8 2.4 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.5 
Belgian banks 8.7 5.6 5.7 3.8 2.0 1.3 4.5 
Finnish banks 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
French banks 9.4 19.1 24.4 28.4 36.7 39.6 26.2 
German banks 22.0 18.1 15.9 14.5 20.9 23.7 19.2 
Irish banks 0.0 5.6 3.6 3.2 4.0 0.6 2.8 
Italian banks 2.2 0.0 4.3 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.7 
Dutch banks 11.3 8.8 7.9 4.9 5.7 3.5 7.0 
Portuguese banks 1.9 2.3 2.5 2.4 4.6 7.2 3.5 
Spanish banks 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.5 
British banks 5.4 4.6 5.5 4.8 7.1 9.8 6.2 
US banks 5.0 4.1 3.4 2.6 7.7 5.1 4.6 
Others 30.3 28.7 24.0 29.3 5.4 3.3 20.2 
IRELAND 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average
Austrian banks 1.22 1.39 1.16 0.76 1.27 0.64 1.1 
Belgian banks 8.82 10.52 8.42 6.75 5.68 5.62 7.6 
Finnish banks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.0 
French banks 7.30 9.06 12.02 10.10 8.47 6.55 8.9 
German banks 25.78 23.95 25.90 29.97 29.88 26.13 26.9 
Greek banks 0.22 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.11 0.1 
Italian banks 3.71 2.96 3.43 3.62 2.83 2.99 3.3 
Dutch banks 9.92 7.49 5.69 5.25 4.58 3.70 6.1 
Portuguese banks 0.52 0.75 0.40 0.56 0.76 1.14 0.7 
Spanish banks 3.11 3.81 3.04 2.20 2.38 2.22 2.8 
British banks 26.49 26.91 26.21 28.22 27.12 29.91 27.5 
US banks 3.15 3.97 4.51 4.89 9.28 11.27 6.2 
Others 9.77 9.07 9.15 7.63 7.67 9.57 8.8 
PORTUGAL 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
Austrian banks 1.39 1.31 1.09 1.11 1.15 0.81 1.1 
Belgian banks 5.14 6.65 4.77 5.28 2.33 1.75 4.3 
Finnish banks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.19 0.0 
French banks 10.28 10.55 13.79 13.11 17.83 13.33 13.1 
German banks 20.64 19.27 20.05 19.50 18.79 18.03 19.4 
Greek banks 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.0 
Irish banks 0.00 4.30 3.62 2.78 2.16 1.35 2.4 
Italian banks 3.18 3.83 3.39 2.72 2.66 2.01 3.0 
Dutch banks 7.45 6.66 7.39 6.07 5.61 3.24 6.1 
Spanish banks 35.12 31.99 32.23 33.93 33.71 41.89 34.8 
British banks 11.17 8.68 8.55 9.62 10.20 12.05 10.0 
US banks 1.64 2.26 1.51 0.81 1.85 2.61 1.8 
Others 3.98 4.50 3.60 5.05 3.66 2.70 3.9 
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SPAIN 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average
Austrian banks 0.86 0.87 0.82 0.87 0.96 0.95 0.9 
Belgian banks 4.22 4.52 4.44 4.82 2.46 3.06 3.9 
Finnish banks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.22 0.0 
French banks 18.25 14.94 18.92 19.35 22.97 20.01 19.1 
German banks 26.51 30.07 29.23 27.83 25.89 25.88 27.6 
Greek banks 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.0 
Irish banks 0.00 3.86 3.84 3.70 3.45 2.13 2.8 
Italian banks 2.49 2.34 2.70 3.12 3.39 4.22 3.0 
Dutch banks 16.87 13.95 13.36 13.69 13.02 10.94 13.6 
Portugal banks 2.61 2.84 2.77 3.14 3.14 3.80 3.0 
British banks 15.23 13.84 12.55 13.66 11.98 15.25 13.8 
US banks 4.55 4.72 4.12 3.67 6.31 6.72 5.0 
Others 8.35 8.02 7.25 6.12 6.37 6.78 7.1 
ITALY 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average
Austrian banks 2.64 2.19 2.04 1.61 2.23 2.58 2.2 
Belgian banks 10.85 8.09 4.38 4.74 2.83 2.99 5.6 
Finnish banks 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.0 
French banks 18.94 27.45 37.66 42.79 44.44 45.53 36.1 
German banks 25.26 20.10 19.41 18.91 16.60 18.82 19.9 
Greek banks 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.1 
Irish banks 0.00 5.20 3.94 4.25 3.99 1.53 3.2 
Dutch banks 10.84 13.82 11.65 6.11 6.04 5.26 9.0 
Portuguese banks 0.76 0.75 0.41 0.32 0.47 0.35 0.5 
Spanish banks 4.44 2.99 2.82 4.44 4.13 3.62 3.7 
British banks 9.22 7.02 7.09 6.83 6.71 7.70 7.4 
US banks 5.78 3.25 2.79 2.33 4.66 4.26 3.8 
Others 11.12 9.08 7.78 7.65 7.84 7.21 8.4 
Note: Table 8 displays the consolidated claims on an immediate borrower basis of Bank for International Settlements (BIS) by 
nationality of reporting banks as a proportion of total foreign claims on each country. Data correspond to the end of each year.  
Source: This table has been constructed from data collected from Table 9D of BIS Quarterly Review: June 2011 
 
The information provided in Table 8 is very 
useful for understanding the channels of con-
tagion of debt crises through the banking sys-
tem. It can be observed that at the end of 2010 
French and German banks were the most ex-
posed to foreign Greek debt, holding 39.6% 
and 23.7% of total foreign Greek claims re-
spectively. In the case of Ireland, the maxi-
mum risk was borne by British banks (29.9%) 
followed by the Germans (26.13%). A Portu-
guese default would be especially harmful for 
Spanish banks which hold 41.9% of Portu-
guese banks’ total claims. Finally, around 45% 
of Spanish and Italian foreign claims are held 
by French and German banks.  
 
Finally, as we above mentioned, we also intro-
duce an instrument that might capture inves-
tor behavior-based reasons of contagion.  
 
ix) We use the credit rating as a 
proxy of the default risk (RAT). Stan-
dard &Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch rat-
ings for each government’s debt are 
compiled from Bloomberg. Following 
Blanco (2001), we build up a scale to 
gauge the effect of investor sentiment 
based on the rating offered by the 
three agencies18. 
 
3.3. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Given that the instruments used as dependent 
variables are published each month, we need 
to compute the dependent variable in the pro-
bit models on a monthly basis. To do so, we 
first assign a value of 1 to the daily observation 
if the time-varying causality indicator is 
greater than its average plus two standard er-
rors. In the second step, we compute the 
monthly data by averaging the daily observa-
tion and assigning a value of 1 if the resulting 
monthly average is greater than 0.5 (i. e., if at 
least for half of the month there is evidence of 
contagion).  
 
In Table 9 we report the results of the probit 
models estimated by maximum likelihood for 
the sample period March 2005 to March 
                                                 
18 By construction, the higher the scale, the worse the rating 
categories. 
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Table 9: Probit models 
Greece → Ireland 
  Coefficient z-Statistic
GRIEBAN 19.4772 2.5471 
GRGOVDEB -0.0607 -2.2599 
GROGR -0.1322 -2.1527 
DEFIE 0.1165 2.0749 
IEBAN -0.0312 -2.2786 
IEPRI 0.0196 2.1867 
GRBANDEB 0.1266 2.2458 
McFadden R-
squared 0.7386    
 Ireland → Greece 
  Coefficient z-Statistic
Constant -2.8012 -2.0634 
IEGRBAN 91.6240 2.9967 
IEPUB 1.2065 2.9655 
DEFIE 0.0926 2.2747 
McFadden R-
squared 0.7198    
Greece → Italy 
  Coefficient z-Statistic
Constant 165.0794 2.1985 
GRITBAN 3.5560 2.2579 
INFGR 4.580 3.672 
GROGR -6.3392 -3.4648 
RATGR 1.2271 -2.0386 
GRGOVDEB 0.8118 -2.1946 
McFadden R-
squared 0.8058    
Italy → Greece  
  Coefficient z-Statistic
Constant -177.6220 -2.7693 
ITGRBAN 3.8020 2.5559 
DEFIT 0.6852 2.4742 
ITBANDEB 0.0458 2.5783 
LEAIT -0.428 -2.6075 
RATGRE 4.0481 3.8010 
ITPUB 2.7413 2.6193 
ITHOUDEB 6.1249 2.9754 
McFadden R-
squared 0.7341    
Greece → Portugal 
  Coefficient z-Statistic
Contant -3.1133 -2.1357 
GRPTBAN 53.5999 2.5940 
INFGR 2.3869 2.1412 
UGR 7.7531 2.7749 
GRGOVDEB 0.8771 3.4462 
VARRATPT 5.8638 3.9751 
GRNFIDEB 1.1808 3.9503 
GRPUB 1.6704 2.6380 
GRPRI 0.8294 3.4910 
McFadden R-
squared 0.8474    
 Portugal → Greece 
  Coefficient z-Statistic
Constant -96.3741 -4.2545 
PTGRBAN 5.9734 3.3352 
INFPT 3.2890 3.9156 
UPT 8.1793 4.2537 
DEFPT 0.3027 2.3217 
PTNFIDEB 1.3158 2.7293 
PTPUB 0.5964 2.3633 
PTBANDEB 0.9296 2.6373 
McFadden R-
squared 0.7386    
 
201019. The z-statistics in that table are based 
on robust standard errors computed using the  
                                                 
19 The reduction in the sample period is imposed by the avail-
ability of data regarding the consolidated claims of Bank for 
International Settlements’ reporting banks on each sector. 
Huber-White quasi-maximum likelihood 
method.   
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Spain → Portugal 
  Coefficient z-Statistic
Constant -40.6506 -2.8468 
SPPTBAN 6.9212 2.1449 
SPNFIDEB 2.6210 3.2914 
UPOR 3.1901 2.7406 
McFadden R-
squared 0.6611    
 Portugal → Spain 
  Coefficient z-Statistic
PTSPBAN 12.1144 2.5430 
DEFPT 0.3725 2.1648 
GROPT -13.9959 -2.6106 
INFPT -6.6052 -2.3755 
VARRATPT 0.2782 2.2489 
GROSP 12.8877 2.6820 
SPGOVDEB -1.1445 -2.5831 
McFadden R-
squared 0.8088    
Spain → Italy 
  Coefficient z-Statistic
Constant 18.1615 2.1399 
SPITBAN 4.7558 2.3862 
DEFSP 0.2929 2.1964 
LEASP -3.4998 -2.8219 
SPGOVDEB 1.9947 2.4978 
CACSP -2.5224 -2.8436 
LEAIT 2.8028 2.2771 
ITPUB 3.1219 2.1977 
RATIT 2.4639 2.2641 
McFadden R-
squared 0.6269    
Italy → Spain  
  Coefficient z-Statistic
Constant -27.3744 -2.0622 
ITSPBAN 2.8219 2.0290 
DEFIT 0.5317 2.1852 
ITBANDEB 0.3654 2.2033 
LEAIT -0.2687 2.8245 
RATSP 10.2186 3.2582 
ITGOVDEB 0.1419 2.5303 
UIT 6.9282 2.8391 
McFadden R-
squared 0.7466    
Italy → Ireland 
  Coefficient z-Statistic
Constant 69.3280 3.1186 
ITIEBAN 6.2755 3.4121 
DEFIT 0.0083 2.0548 
ITBANDEB 0.3962 3.5773 
LEAIT -0.9472 4.1862 
RATIE 5.5569 4.6048 
ITHOUDEB 1.4920 2.8739 
ITGOVDEB 0.5991 3.5876 
McFadden R-
squared 0.6557    
 Ireland → Italy 
  Coefficient z-Statistic
Constant -34.7139 -3.7590 
IEITBAN 0.0110 2.0619 
IEPUB 4.9328 3.8503 
DEFIE 0.3727 3.0778 
INFIE 1.6927 3.5820 
McFadden R-
squared 0.8173    
Portugal → Ireland 
  Coefficient z-Statistic
Constant 5.8309 2.3371 
PTIEBAN 53.9490 2.5308 
DEFPT 1.3717 3.1335 
GROPT -1.3577 -2.6080 
INFPT 1.8180 2.0768 
RATPT 0.8849 2.4420 
GROIE -0.2628 -2.4346 
IEGOVDEB 0.0779 2.2206 
McFadden R-
squared 0.7313    
Ireland → Portugal 
  Coefficient z-Statistic
Constant -103.6540 -4.7475 
IEPTBAN 1.0914 2.9016 
IEPUB 2.1862 2.8636 
DEFIE 0.7100 3.1511 
LEAIE -2.9091 -4.4582 
IEBAN 0.2298 2.4472 
IEGOVDEB 1.9663 2.9986 
UPT 5.5731 2.3205 
CACPT -6.9992 -4.8327 
McFadden R-
squared 0.8195    
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Spain → Ireland 
  Coefficient z-Statistic
Constant 98.8600 2.8023 
SPIEBAN 1.2292 2.1407 
DEFSP 0.0476 2.8906 
LEASP 1.2608 3.1738 
SPBAN 2.1513 2.9228 
SPGOVDEB 2.2618 3.0030 
CACSP -0.6272 -2.1229 
GROIE -0.7570 -3.7996 
SPBANDEB 0.3240 2.7109 
McFadden R-
squared 0.6750    
 Ireland → Spain 
  Coefficient z-Statistic
Constant -4.4028 -2.6272 
IESPBAN 0.3133 2.6764 
IEPUB 1.7950 3.1077 
DEFIE 0.4638 3.2044 
IEBAN 0.0749 3.1281 
IEGOVDEB 1.0637 3.1027 
USP 2.2242 2.9601 
McFadden R-
squared 0.7045    
Portugal → Italy 
  Coefficient z-Statistic
Constant -59.3698 -4.0692 
PTITBAN 4.8112 2.4425 
DEFPT 0.4549 2.2626 
UPT 2.5365 2.1736 
RATPT 7.2804 3.9456 
UIT 2.5939 3.0013 
PTPUB 1.8024 4.2752 
RATIT 1.0716 2.6486 
PTGOVDEB 0.7401 3.3067 
McFadden R-
squared 0.5595    
Italy → Portugal 
  Coefficient z-Statistic
Constant 28.0712 2.0045 
ITPTBAN 6.8975 3.3487 
DEFIT 0.6021 2.5329 
UIT 3.5979 2.8359 
UPT 5.7698 2.7683 
ITHOUDEB 2.7336 3.2757 
RATIT 1.3327 2.1908 
ITGOVDEB 1.3677 3.2470 
McFadden R-
squared 0.7383    
 
Note: 
CACXX = Current-account-balance-to-GDP of country XX 
LEAXX = Leading indicator index rate of growth of country XX 
GROXX = GDP (constant prices) rate of growth of country XX 
UXX = Unemployment rate of country XX 
INFXX = Inflation rate of country XX 
RATXX = Credit rating scale of country XX. 
DEFXX = Government deficit-to-GDP of country XX. 
XXGOVDEB = Government debt-to-GDP of country XX. 
XXBANDEB = Bank debt-to-GDP of country XX 
XXNFIDEB = Non-financial corporations debt-to-GDP of country XX 
XXHOUDEB = Households debt-to-GDP of country XX 
XXBAN = Foreign bank claims on banks debt-to-GDP of country XX 
XXPUB = Foreign bank claims on government debt-to-GDP of country XX 
XXPRI = Foreign bank claims on non-financial private debt-to-GDP of country XX 
XXYYBAN = Percentage of country XX’s foreign claims held by country YY’s banks 
 
The analysis of the coefficient values is com-
plicated by the fact that coefficients estimated 
from a binary model cannot be interpreted as 
the marginal effect on the dependent variable. 
Nevertheless, the direction of the effect of a 
change in any instrument depends only on the 
sign of the coefficient estimated: positive val-
ues imply that an increase in a given instru-
ment will raise the probability of contagion, 
while negative values indicate the opposite. 
 
Interestingly, the variable XXYYBAN is statis-
tically significant in all cases; suggesting that, 
in a scenario of increased cross-border finan-
cial activity in the euro area, contagion of the 
crisis in one country to other countries 
through the banking system can be a major 
issue.  
 
Regarding the measures of the country’s fiscal 
position, our results indicate that both 
GOVDEB and DEF are key determinants of the 
probability of a contagion episode. As for the 
instruments used to gauge the level of com-
petitiveness of a given country, our estima-
tions suggest that both CAC and INF are sta-
tistically significant with the expected sign. In 
particular, they are extremely useful when 
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explaining the contagion from Greece, Spain 
and Portugal. In relation to the variables used 
to capture the country’s growth potential, we 
find a positive influence for U and a negative 
effect for LEA and GRO, suggesting that the 
stronger the economy, the lower the probabil-
ity of contagion in debt markets. This conclu-
sion is particularly relevant in the case of 
Greece, Italy and Portugal. 
 
With regard to the role of private debt, we find 
empirical evidence supporting its importance 
in the cases of Spain and Italy. Interestingly, 
this variable is not significant in the case of 
Ireland, even though some authors have 
claimed that it was the main cause of the debt 
crisis in this country. Nevertheless, we detect a 
major effect of foreign bank claims on banking 
and non-financial private sector debt-to-GDP 
on the probability of contagion from Ireland. 
This finding seems to underline the depend-
ence of Ireland’s domestic expansion on for-
eign borrowing. 
Finally, as regards the impact of investor sen-
timent, the credit rating scale seems to be an 
important determinant in six out of the 20 
cases considered.  
 
In Table 9 we report the McFadden R-squared 
as a measure of goodness of the fit. As can be 
seen, it ranges from 0.5595 to 0.8388, suggest-
ing the relative success of the probit regression 
models in predicting the values of the depend-
ent variable within the sample. As a further 
test to evaluate how well our estimated probit 
models fit the observations, we compute the 
fitted probability both within-sample and out-
of-sample. Recall that when generating our 
contagion indicator, we left out nine observa-
tions (April to December 2010) that were not 
used in the estimation. This allows us to 
evaluate the out-of-sample performance of the 
estimated probit models based on the actual 
evolution of the instrumental variables.  Figure 
3 reports the results. 
 
Figure 3: Probit results 
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As can be seen, the fitted probabilities closely 
track the evolution of the observed within-
sample probabilities. Regarding the out-of-
sample probabilities, our results suggest the 
occurrence of an additional contagion episode 
in the last months of 2010 coinciding with a 
period of renewed turbulence in European 
debt markets. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper presents a dynamic approach to the 
analysis of the evolution of the degree of cau-
sality and contagion between peripheral EMU 
public debt markets (Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and Spain). To this end, we have (1) 
tested for the existence of possible causal rela-
tionships between the evolution of the yield of 
these countries’ issues, (2) examined the time-
varying nature of these causal relationships to 
detect episodes of contagion between them, 
and (3) analyzed the determinants of these 
contagion events. 
 
It seems increasingly clear that the origin of 
sovereign debt crisis in Europe has gone be-
yond the imbalances in public finances and 
that there is also an obvious interconnection 
between public and private debt. As a result, 
we have analyzed the role of this interconnec-
tion in the episodes of contagion by using a 
unique dataset on private debt-to-GDP by sec-
tor (households, banks and non-financial cor-
porations) in each peripheral EMU country. 
Besides, since the reasons for contagion can be 
fundamental-based or investor behavior-based, 
we have included instruments that capture 
both types. In addition, we have borne in mind 
that fundamental-based contagion works not 
only through real linkages, but also through 
financial linkages across countries. Specifi-
cally, in the current scenario of increased 
cross-border financial activity in the euro area, 
special attention has been paid to the impact of 
the degree of integration of the banking system 
on the speed at which a sovereign crisis in a 
country can spill over to others. This channel 
of contagion has generally been ignored by the 
recent literature, but its relevance is crucial.  
 
The main results of our analysis can be sum-
marized as follows. Firstly, the results of the 
rolling analysis we apply in order to explore 
the dynamic causality between peripheral 
EMU yields suggest that there exist sub-
periods of Granger causality in all pair-wise 
relationships. Given the absence of consensus 
in the literature on how contagion should be 
defined, we have identified contagion episodes 
as sub-periods of significant increase in causal-
ity. Hence, our empirical evidence suggests 
that these episodes are concentrated around 
the first year of the launch of the EMU in 
1999, the introduction of euro coins and 
banknotes in 2002 and the global financial 
crisis in the late-2000s. Our results also indi-
cate that the causality relationships between 
peripheral EMU yields have been significantly 
reinforced during the recent crises in sover-
eign debt markets since 2009, providing evi-
dence of an increase in the contagion between 
them. 
 
Secondly, the results of the probit models es-
timated to analyze the determinants of the 
previously detected contagion episodes indi-
cate that in all cases the variable that captures 
cross-border banking linkages is statistically 
significant. This finding suggests that, in a 
scenario of increased international financial 
activity in the euro area, contagion of the crisis 
in one country to other countries through the 
banking system may be an important issue. It 
is important to recall that macroeconomic 
imbalances in a specific country (the instru-
ments we have used to capture them also indi-
cate that they are key determinants of the 
probability of occurrence of a contagion epi-
sode) lead to rising sovereign spreads and a 
devaluation of the government debt that is 
mirrored in banks’ balance sheets. Lastly, re-
garding the role of private debt, we find evi-
dence of its importance in the cases of Spain 
and Italy. However, we detect a major effect of 
foreign bank claims on banking and non-
financial private sector debt-to-GDP on the 
probability of contagion from Ireland, which 
seems to underline the dependence of Ireland’s 
domestic boom on foreign borrowing. 
 
In the current context of uncertainty in Euro-
pean sovereign debt markets, the analysis pre-
sented in this paper deals with a subject that 
has not been addressed in sufficient depth by 
the literature and is of particular relevance 
both to academics and to policy-makers. 
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